

PREPRINT

Brief Report:

Racial resentment uniquely characterizes White Americans' support for Donald Trump

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Abstract

Despite the popular narrative that White Americans supported Donald Trump in 2016 due to economic concerns, several studies show that their support is more strongly predicted by a variety of social issues concerning race and gender. The present work sought to characterize the core features of these social issues among White Americans by assessing 15 self-report and behavioral measures of social attitudes, in addition to several economic, political, and demographic indicators, and comparing their relative effects on Trump support during the Biden and second Trump presidential terms. In both studies, conducted in 2022 (N=906) and 2026 (N=1206), racial resentment was the strongest predictor of Trump support relative to all other measures of social, economic, and political concerns. Economic stress was negatively associated with Trump support. Furthermore, we find that, among conservatives, the relation between racial resentment and Trump support aligns more closely with MAGA identity than with conservatism generally. These findings clarify the nature of White Americans' support for Trump, show its sustained association across presidential administrations, and link it closely to the MAGA movement.

What drives White Americans' support for Donald Trump? Despite popular narratives invoking economic stress, several studies have shown that social issues regarding race and gender most strongly explain their support (1–4). However, the specific nature of these social issues and their effects relative to other political and economic factors remain unclear because these factors are rarely compared within a single investigation. Furthermore, because most prior studies were conducted around the beginning of Trump's first term, immediately following the presidency of Barack Obama, the nation's first Black president, it is possible that the nature of White Americans' support for Trump has changed during the Biden administration and Trump's second term. In the present work, we sought to characterize the social issues most strongly driving White Americans' Trump support and test whether these patterns have changed since Trump's first term.

White Americans' support for right-wing politicians has long been animated by anti-Black racial resentment (5, 6) and, indeed, this sentiment has been shown to predict their support for Trump in 2016 (4). However, other research has linked Trump support to more contemporary concerns about racial status threat and White identity—issues that have become increasingly salient in an era of shifting demographics (1–3). Still other work has linked support for Trump and right-wing politicians with issues surrounding gender and gender diversity, such as sexism, homophobia, transphobia, and hegemonic masculinity (7–9)—concerns that often align with racial prejudice but suggest a shift away from the centrality of racial issues. At the same time, political factors such as populism and authoritarian beliefs—traditional explanations of right-wing support not directly tied to issues of race and gender—have also been linked to White Americans' Trump support (10, 11). These findings—which implicate several distinct factors in White Americans' support of Trump—raise the question of whether these factors can be characterized by a dominant underlying motive or whether the specific social concerns of Trump supporters have changed over time.

Additionally, although economic concerns did not predict support in past studies (2–4), economic changes in recent years may have increased the relevance of these concerns to Trump support. Norms for expressing prejudice, sexism, and xenophobia have also changed, becoming more permissive during the Trump presidencies (12, 13), which raises new questions about the relative influence of social vs. economic concerns on Trump support in recent years.

To address these questions, we analyzed data from two large studies of White Americans with four major aims: To compare the effects of racial resentment and economic stress on Trump support, to characterize the type of social attitude that most strongly drives Trump support, to compare these social attitudes with popular alternative explanations, and to assess change in these patterns over the past four years. Whereas nationally representative surveys (e.g., the

American National Election Studies Survey) used in prior research have limited sets of very brief surveys, our research included an expanded set of measures, including behavioral assessments (e.g., of implicit prejudice) and multi-item questionnaires, while retaining gender balance, age variability, and representation across all 50 US states (see Methods and SI).

Results

Study 1 ($N=906$, spring of 2022) assessed 15 measures of racial and gender-related attitudes and beliefs, as well as economic stress, ideology, and demographics (see SI). Our focal measure of racial resentment was a six-item version of the Modern Racism Scale (6), which probes the denial of racial discrimination, resentment about diversity initiatives, and the belief that efforts to promote equality are unfair to White people.

We first compared the effects of racial resentment and economic concerns. Correlation analyses indicated that Trump support was strongly associated with racial resentment but weakly (negatively) associated with perceived economic stress (Fig 1A) as well as reported income, $r=.12$, $p<.001$. In a simultaneous regression comparing unique effects of racial resentment and economic stress, Trump support was strongly predicted by racial resentment, $\beta=.71$, $t=29.84$, $p<.001$, but not economic stress, $\beta=.00$, $t=.07$, $p=.95$. This pattern replicated when left-right political ideology, support for Joe Biden, education, income, age, and gender were included as covariates (see SI).

Next, to examine whether Trump support can be characterized by a particular subset of social concerns, we compared the effects of 15 measures of race- and gender-related attitudes. All but one were associated with Trump support in direct correlations and more strongly tied to Trump support than Biden support (Fig 1A). However, when included simultaneously, along with perceived economic stress, in a regression analysis predicting Trump support, racial resentment was the strongest unique predictor (Fig 1B) ($\beta=.56$, $t=12.09$, $p<.001$). This pattern remained when adjusting for ideology, age, income, and education (see SI).

Finally, we tested our preregistered hypotheses that contemporary concerns about racial status threat predict Trump support by enhancing racial resentment. Consistent with this theorized pathway, a mediation analysis revealed a significant indirect effect of racial status threat on Trump support via racial resentment, $b=.62$, 95% CI [.54,.70] (Fig 1C).




Figure 1. Predictors of Trump support in 2022 (Study 1). (A) Zero-order correlations (r) between social and economic variables and support for Donald Trump and Joe Biden (see SI for means and SDs), * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. (B) Regression coefficient plot showing unique effects of these variables on Trump support, with the strongest effect emerging for racial resentment. (C) Mediation analysis illustrating an indirect effect of racial status threat on Trump support via racial resentment.

In Study 2, a stratified sample was recruited ($N=1,206$) that included similar proportions of self-identified liberal, moderate, and conservative participants. This design addressed a slight liberal skew in Study 1 while permitting us to distinguish, within conservatives, the role of racial resentment in Trump support as opposed to more general conservative views.

Direct correlations again showed that Trump support was strongly associated with anti-Black racial resentment, but negatively associated with economic stress (Fig 2A) and not significantly related to reported income, $r=.01$, $p=.758$. This pattern replicated in a regression directly comparing racial resentment and economic stress effects on Trump support (racial resentment: $\beta=.61$, $t=27.25$, $p<.001$; economic stress: $\beta=-.13$, $t=5.95$, $p<.001$), and persisted when adjusting for political orientation, education, income, age, and gender (see SI).

The social concern driving Trump support was again best characterized as racial resentment: when seven measures assessing race- and gender-related attitudes were compared, racial resentment continued to be the strongest unique predictor (Fig 2B). Further replicating Study 1, racial status threat predicted Trump support indirectly via racial resentment (indirect mediation effect $b=.93$, 95% CI [.82, 1.05]).

Next, we compared the effect of racial resentment with a set of political factors including left behind beliefs, right-wing authoritarianism, populist beliefs, and anti-immigration beliefs. Of these, racial resentment was the strongest unique predictor of Trump support (see Fig 2B).

Finally, we asked whether the association between racial prejudice and Trump support is specific to Trump and the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement as opposed to a more general conservative identity. First, the pattern of racial resentment and economic stress effects on Trump support in the full sample replicated within each ideology group (see SI). Second, although identification with MAGA and conservatism were highly correlated within the conservative subsample, $r(403)=.77$, $p<.001$, 78% identified strongly as conservative (scoring 8 or higher on an 11-point scale) whereas only 50% identified strongly with MAGA, and the effect of racial resentment on Trump support was more strongly mediated by MAGA identity, $b=.65$, 95% CI[.62,.68] than by conservative identity, $b=.29$, 95% CI[.25,.33] in a parallel-mediation analysis.




Figure 2. Predictors of Trump support in 2026 (Study 2). (A) Zero-order correlations (r) between social attitude and political variables and support for Donald Trump and (B) plot showing unique effects of these variables on Trump support, with the strongest effect again emerging for racial resentment.

Comparison of Studies 1 and 2

Although results from Studies 1 and 2 are not directly comparable because Study 2 was stratified on ideology, comparisons on ideology-adjusted scores between 2022 and 2026 revealed no significant differences on key variables of Trump support, perceived economic stress, racial resentment, and racial status threat (combined $N=2,112$; all p values $>.10$). Furthermore, racial resentment strongly predicted Trump support across samples, $\beta=.67$, $t=41.63$, $p<.001$, and this relationship was not moderated by sampling time (Time $\times$ Racial Resentment interaction: $\beta=.02$, $t=1.20$, $p=.229$).

Discussion

While our results corroborate prior work linking Trump support to a range of social issues, including racial resentment, status threat, sexism, and homophobia (2–4, 7–9), we show for the first time—using an expanded set of measures relative to prior studies—that among these concerns, racial resentment is the strongest unique predictor. Indeed, aside from a direct measure of ideology (see SI), racial resentment was the strongest unique predictor of all measured variables—even outpredicting right-wing authoritarianism and immigration attitudes in Study 2—suggesting that this construct captures a core concern driving White Americans’ Trump support.

Our research further examined the extent to which this phenomenon—racial resentment driving White Americans’ Trump support—reflects their broader conservative views or pertains more specifically to identification with the MAGA movement. Study 2 found that while conservative and MAGA identities were highly overlapping among conservative participants, the link between racial resentment and Trump support was more characteristic of the MAGA movement than of conservatism at large.

In addition to these novel contributions, the results of both studies replicate prior findings associating racial issues, and not economic stress, with Trump support, suggesting again that popular narratives focused on economic issues may fail to capture the concerns leading White Americans to support Trump.

Together, these results reveal that social issues continue to predict White Americans’ support for Donald Trump in 2022 and 2026, and that while these issues are multifaceted, the strongest unique predictor compared with all other examined social, economic, and demographic factors is anti-Black racial resentment.

Method

See SI for complete methods and preregistration information. All data underlying any published paper as a condition of publication.

Data Availability. All anonymized data, materials, and analysis code will be shared upon publication.

Study 1

Participants. 906 White-identified US-based participants (405 women, 496 men, 5 “other”; $M_{\text{age}} = 40.46$, range = 19–78; opt-in) were recruited via CloudResearch in spring 2022 and paid \$10.

Procedure. Measures were completed online via Qualtrics in this order: Implicit Association Test, demographics (age, gender, race/ethnicity, education, income), left-right ideology, Trump support, Biden support, perceived economic stress, Modern Racism, Perceived Racial Status Threat, Social Dominance Orientation, Zero Sum Race Beliefs, Internal and External Motivations to Respond Without Prejudice, Feeling Thermometer Towards Racial/Ethnic Groups, Racial Identity Strength, Racial Essentialism, Attitudes Towards Homosexuality, Nonbinary Acceptance, Hostile and Benevolent Sexism.

Study 2

Participants. 1,206 White-identified US-based participants (585 women, 602 men, 19 “other”; $M_{\text{age}} = 41.23$, range = 18–84; opt-in) were recruited via Prolific in spring 2026 and paid \$10.

Procedure. Measures were completed online via Qualtrics in this order: demographics (age, gender, race/ethnicity, education, income), left-right ideology, Trump support, MAGA support, Social Dominance Orientation, perceived economic stress, Modern Racism, Zero Sum Race Beliefs, Feeling Thermometer Towards Racial/Ethnic Groups, Perceived Racial Status Threat, Hostile and Benevolent Sexism, immigration attitudes, populist beliefs, right-wing authoritarianism, left behind beliefs.

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Supporting Information for
Racial resentment continues to characterize White Americans' support for Donald Trump

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1. Data sources

Data used in the current research come from two broader studies conducted by the authors examining effects of race and prejudice in White American's trust in AI and facial image annotations of race and gender. However, the measures reported in the present work were included for the purpose of examining predictors of Trump support.

2. Preregistrations

Study 1 was preregistered (AsPredicted.org #220014) after data collection was complete but before data were analyzed for this study. Study 2 was preregistered (AsPredicted.org #295592) as data collection began, prior to study completion or the processing of any data.

The original preregistered hypotheses focused on racial status threat, as a direct predictor of Trump support and as a mediator of racial resentment (Modern Racism) effects; however, after analyzing Study 1 results, it became clear that racial resentment was the stronger, more direct predictor. Thus, for the replication study, the hypothesis was revised: while the Study 2 preregistration retained the focus on racial status threat, the hypothesis changed to predict that racial resentment was the more direct predictor and mediated the effect of status threat on Trump support. The current paper is written in line with the hypothesis described in the Study 2 preregistration, but with a focus on the direct predictor of racial resentment.

The preregistered exclusions were the same for each study. Findings in the main text reflect exclusions for failed attention checks, outlying duration, and non-White identity, as well as for missing data.

3. Methods

Both studies were approved by the authors' Institutional Review Boards; Study 1 at New York University and Study 2 at the University of Amsterdam. In each, all participants provided informed consent and received debriefing on the study's main purpose.

Study 1

Participants

US-based participants ($N = 1,238$) were recruited via the CloudResearch platform (Amazon MTurk) in the spring of 2022 and completed the study for \$10. Although White identity was an eligibility requirement on the recruitment platform, approximately 200 participants listed another racial identity during the main study. Following exclusions due to failed attention check, incomplete responses, or outlying scores, the sample included 1,169 participants (512 women, 648 men, and 9 "a gender not listed above"), comprising 906 self-identified as White, 135 as Multiracial or another race/ethnicity, and 95 self-identified as Black. The final, preregistered sample included 906 White participants (405 women, 496 men, 5 "gender not listed above"; $M_{\text{age}} = 40.46$, range = 19–78). Based on US provided zip codes, the sample represented participants from 47 US states as well as Washington DC and Puerto Rico. Mean ideology from 0 (very liberal) to 100 (very conservative) was 39.83 ($SD = 31.12$), suggesting a slight liberal lean.

Procedure

All participants completed the study online. After providing consent, participants completed a face annotation task unrelated to the present research. Next, they completed an Implicit Association Test assessing Black vs. White implicit attitudes, followed by measures of demographics (age, gender, race/ethnicity, education, income), ideology and political support (including Trump support), perceived economic stress, and several measures related to intergroup bias and gender (described below in *Measures*). Upon completion, participants were debriefed, thanked, and paid.

Measures

The survey included brief versions of validated questionnaires, completed in the order listed below following the face labeling task. For each, the exact wording of the questions and response items is given, along with the Cronbach alpha estimate of reliability (where appropriate). For all measures with multiple items, responses were averaged into composite scores using reverse-coded scores when appropriate.

Implicit Association Test (IAT): A standard, seven-block evaluative IAT based on Amodio and Devine (2006) and scored following Greenwald et al. (2003) and Traast et al. (2025)

Age: assessed as a free response.

Biological sex: “What is your biological sex?” *Female, male, a biological sex not listed above.*

Gender: With what gender do you identify? *Woman, man, a gender not listed above.*

Race (based on US Census): “With what racial or ethnic groups do you identify (please select all that apply):” *White, Black or African American, American Indian of Alaska Native, Asian Indian, Chinese, Filipino, Japanese, Korean, Vietnamese, Other Asian (for example: Hmong, Laotian, Thai, Pakistani, Cambodian, and so on), Native Hawaiian, Guamanian or Chamorro, Samoan, Other Pacific Islander (for example: Fijian, Tongan, and so on), Some other race*

Education: “What is the highest degree or level of education you have completed?” *Less than high school, High school graduate (includes GED or alternative credential), Some college credit, no degree, Associate's degree (for example: AA, AS), Bachelor's degree (for example: BA, BS), Master's degree (for example: MA, MS, MEd, MSW, MBA, MEng), Professional degree beyond a bachelor's degree (for example: MD, DDS, LLB, JD), Doctorate degree (for example: PhD, EdD)*
Zip code: In what zip code do you live?

Income: “What is your combined yearly family/household income?” 20-point scale in \$10,000 increments, ranging from “Under \$20,000 per year” to “Over \$200,000 per year.”

Ideology: “How would you describe your political opinions, generally speaking?” 100-point slider scale, with equally-spaced labels ranging from *Very Liberal* (0), *Liberal*, *Somewhat Liberal*, *Moderate* (50), *Somewhat Conservative*, *Conservative*, *Very Conservative* (100).

Political party identity: “Generally speaking, do you consider yourself a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, or something else?” *Democrat, Republican, Independent, Something else*

Trump support: “How much do you support Donald Trump? 11-point scale, from 0 = *DO NOT support AT ALL* to 10 = *COMPLETELY support.*”

Biden support: “How much do you support Joe Biden, from 0 = *DO NOT support AT ALL* to 10 = *COMPLETELY support?*”

Perceived Economic Stress: “Below are a series of statements about the economy, with which you may or may not agree with. To what extent do you agree with each of the following statements, from 0 = completely DISAGREE to 10 = completely AGREE?” *There is a lot of competition over resources these days in society; People today generally have enough resources to thrive; The current economy is strong enough to support all members of society; In today's economy, there is not enough to go around.*

Social Dominance (SDO_{7(s)} scale; Ho et al., 2015): “Below are a series of related ideas about society. Show how much you favor or oppose each idea below by selecting a response, from 0 = completely DISAGREE to 10 = completely AGREE. You are welcome to respond quickly. Your initial or "gut" feelings are generally best.” *An ideal society requires some groups to be on top and others to be on the bottom; Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups; No one group should dominate in society; Groups at the bottom are just as deserving as groups at the top; Group equality should not be our primary goal; It is unjust to try to make groups equal; We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups; We should work to give all groups an equal chance to succeed.*

Attention Check: “Next, we would like to ask you about your media consumption. In today's media landscape, people have many choices for where to go to get their news, especially with the digital media space expanding rapidly. We also want to see if people are reading the questions carefully. To show that you have read these instructions, please select both radio shows and other sources, and only those options. Ignore the question below.” *Which of the following sources do you choose most often when consuming news? Print and online newspapers (e.g., The New York Times, Wall Street Journal); National TV news (e.g., CNN, Fox News); Local TV news (e.g., ABC7 NYC, NBC 5 Dallas-Fort Worth); Radio shows; Podcasts; Social media (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, YouTube); Other sources.*

Racial Resentment/Modern Racism (McConohay, 1983): “The statements below represent different views about race relations in the United States, with which you may agree or disagree. To what extent do you agree with each of the following statements, from 0 = completely DISAGREE to 10 = completely AGREE?” (11-point scale) *Over the past few years, the government and news media have shown more respect to Black people than they deserve; It is easy to understand the anger of Black people in America; Discrimination against Black people is no longer a problem in the United States; There is a real danger that too much emphasis on cultural diversity will tear the United States apart; In the United States, people are no longer judged by the color of their skin; Members of racial minorities have a tendency to blame Whites too much for problems that are of their own doing.*

Zero Sum Race Beliefs (Black/Racial Minority; Krosch & Amodio, 2014): “The statements below represent different views about Black people and White people in the United States. Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each statement, from 0 = completely DISAGREE to 10 = completely AGREE.” *More rights for Black people mean White people lose out; Black people take jobs away from Whites; When Black people get more rights, they are taking rights away from White people; As Black people face less racism, White people end up facing more racism; Less discrimination against Black people means more discrimination against White people; Efforts to reduce discrimination against Black people have led to increased discrimination against White people.*

Internal and External Motivations to Respond Without Prejudice (IMS/EMS; Plant & Devine, 1998): “The following questions concern various reasons or motivations people might have for responding in various ways towards Black people. For each statement, please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree, from 0 = completely DISAGREE to 10 = completely AGREE.” IMS items included *I attempt to act in non-prejudiced ways toward Black people because it is personally important to me; I am personally motivated by my beliefs to be non-prejudiced toward Black people; Because of my personal values, I believe that using stereotypes about Black people is wrong.* EMS items included *I try to hide any negative thoughts about Black people in order to avoid negative reactions from others; Because of today's PC (politically correct) standards I try to appear non-prejudiced toward Black people. I attempt to appear non-prejudiced toward Black people in order to avoid disapproval from others.*

Feeling Thermometer Towards Racial/Ethnic Groups: “You might feel warmly about some groups of people, and coldly about other groups of people. On a scale from 0 (coldest) to 100 (warmest), please rate how cold or warm you feel toward the following groups.” *Black / African American people; East Asian people (for example: Japanese, Chinese, Korean); Indian / South Asian people (for example: Bangladeshi, Pakistani); Hispanic / Latino people; Middle Eastern people; White people.*

Racial Identity Strength: “Below is a statement about how you view yourself. Please read the statement carefully, and indicate your answer based on how much you agree or disagree, from 0 = completely DISAGREE to 10 = completely AGREE.” *My racial identity is an important reflection of who I am.*

Perceived Racial Status Threat (Craig & Richeson, 2014): “Below are two statements about race relations in the United States. Please read each statement carefully, and indicate your answer based on how much you agree or disagree, from 0 = completely DISAGREE to 10 = completely

AGREE.” *Increases in racial minorities' status will reduce White Americans' status; White Americans will be hurt by increasing diversity in the United States.*

Racial Essentialism: “People seem to have different opinions about what “race” is. Sometimes, their ideas about “race” could be quite abstract. We have collected a sample of people's ideas below. We are interested in knowing how you think about these ideas. Please read through each statement carefully. Indicate your degree of agreement with each statement, from 0 = completely DISAGREE to 10 = completely AGREE.” *To a large extent, a person's race biologically determines his or her abilities and traits; Races are just arbitrary categories and can be changed if necessary; How a person is like (his or her abilities, traits) is deeply ingrained in his or her race; It cannot be changed much; Racial categories are fluid, malleable constructs.*

Self-reported Interracial Contact: Contact was assessed on three dimensions—acquaintances, friends, and close friends—separately for White and Black contacts, using the following instructions and scales: “Below are questions about your acquaintances, friends, and close friends. Please read each question carefully and respond with a rating, from None (0%) to Almost All (100%).” Participants responded to each of the following: “What percentage of your ACQUAINTANCES identify as WHITE? What percentage of your FRIENDS identify as WHITE? What percentage of your CLOSE FRIENDS identify as WHITE? What percentage of your ACQUAINTANCES identify as BLACK / AFRICAN AMERICAN? What percentage of your FRIENDS identify as BLACK / AFRICAN AMERICAN? What percentage of your CLOSE FRIENDS identify as BLACK / AFRICAN AMERICAN?” For the present study, difference scores (White - Black) were computed for each dimension, and the difference score for each dimension was averaged into a single composite score. Dimension scores were highly intercorrelated (all r s > .90, p s < .001).

Nonbinary Acceptance: “Below are a series of statements about sex and gender, which you may disagree or agree. For each statement, please rate how much you agree with each statement, from 0 = completely DISAGREE to 10 = completely AGREE.” *A person's gender can change over time; A person can only be a man or a woman; I feel uncomfortable when I cannot tell if someone is a man or a woman; I avoid interacting with people whose gender is unclear to me.*

Attitudes Towards Homosexuality: “Below are a series of statements about sexual preferences, with which you may disagree or agree. For each statement, please rate how much you agree with each statement, from 0 = completely DISAGREE to 10 = completely AGREE.” *Homosexual couples should have the right to marry; Homosexuality is a natural expression of affection and sexuality; Homosexuality goes against human nature; Homosexuality is incompatible with starting a family.*

Hostile and Benevolent Sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996): “Below are a series of statements about the relationship between men and women. Please read each statement carefully, and indicate your answer based on how much you agree or disagree, from 0 = completely DISAGREE to 10 = completely AGREE.” Hostile items: *Women exaggerate problems they have at work; When women lose to men in a fair competition, they typically complain about being discriminated against; Once a woman gets a man to commit to her, she usually tries to put him on a tight leash.* Benevolent items: *Men are incomplete without women; Women should be cherished and protected by men; Every man ought to have a woman whom he adores.*

Additional measures included in the survey but not analyzed here assessed trust in multiple forms of AI, degree of White/Black contact and friendship, stereotype traits of major US (warm, gentle, assertive, aggressive), and zip code.

Study 2

Study 2 included a subset of measures related to racial and gender attitudes as well as several additional measures assessing political views and motivations. The scale for key measures was retained from Study 1, but otherwise used 7-point scales.

Participants

US-based participants ($N = 1,268$) were recruited via the Prolific in the spring of 2026 and completed the study for \$10. Prolific’s prescreening tool was used to limit participation to self-identified White people living in the US and to include equal proportions of self-identified political liberals, moderates, and conservatives. Following exclusions due to failed attention check, incomplete responses, outlying scores, or non-White racial identification within the survey, the final sample included 1206 participants (399 liberal, 498 moderate, 409 conservative). Mean ideology scores for each group, assessed from 0 (very liberal) to 10 (very conservative), were $M_{\text{liberal}} = 1.49$, $SD = 1.67$; $M_{\text{moderate}} = 5.07$, $SD = 1.39$; $M_{\text{conservative}} = 8.39$, $SD = 1.41$. Gender self-identities included 585 women, 602 men, 17 “a gender not listed above,” and 2 “prefer not to say.” Mean age was 41.23 years ($SD = 13.37$, range = 18–84). Based on US provided zip codes, the sample represented participants from all 50 US states as well as Washington DC.

Procedure

The procedure was the same as in Study 1, with the exception that some measures were dropped and others added in Study 2.

Age: Same as in Study 1.

Gender: "With which gender do you identify?" *Female, Male, A gender not listed above, Prefer not to say.*

Race/Ethnicity: "With what racial or ethnic groups do you identify? Please select all categories that apply to you." *White, Black or African American, American Indian or Alaska Native, East Asian, South Asian, Middle Eastern or North African, Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin, Other race, ethnicity, or origin.*

Education: Same as in Study 1

Income: Same as in Study 1.

Commitment item: "Next, we will ask you questions about your opinions and beliefs. We care about the quality of our survey data. For us to get the most accurate measures of your opinions, it is important that you provide thoughtful answers to each question in this survey. Do you commit to providing thoughtful answers to the questions in this survey?" *Yes, No.*

Ideology: "We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a 0 to 10 scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from 0 = "Extremely liberal" to 10 = "Extremely conservative" (5 = Moderate). Where would you place yourself on this scale?"

Trump Support: Same as in Study 1.

MAGA Support: "How much do you identify with the MAGA ("Make America Great Again") movement, from 0 = "Do not identify at all" to 10 = "Completely identify"?"

Social Dominance Orientation: Same as in Study 1, but on a scale from 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree.

Perceived Economic Stress: Same as in Study 1 but with 1-7 scale.

Modern Racism: Same as in Study 1 but with 7-point scale.

Zero Sum Beliefs (White-Black): Same as in Study 1 but with 7-point scale.

Feeling Thermometers: Same as in Study 1, but for *Black Americans; East Asian Americans (for example: Japanese, Chinese, Korean); Latino Americans; Arab and Middle Eastern Americans; White Americans.*

Perceived Racial Status Threat: Same as in Study 1 but with 7-point scale.

Attention Check: “Please select the answer option 3 = “Rather unimportant” below to show that you are paying attention. In this way, we can ensure the quality of the responses.” *Very unimportant; Unimportant; Rather unimportant; Neither important nor unimportant; Rather important; Important; Very important.*

Hostile and Benevolent Sexism: Same as in Study 1 but with a 7-point scale.

Immigration Attitudes (based on De Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2005)DeVreese & Boomgaarden, 2005): “Next, we would like to ask you for your opinion about immigrants. Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements:” using a 7-point scale with 1 being “Strongly disagree” and 7 being “Strongly agree.” *Immigration is good for the labour market; Immigrants cause problems in the schools that their children attend; Immigrants enrich American culture; Members of immigrant groups misuse American social welfare; The religious beliefs of immigrants threaten our way of life; Immigrants have a negative impact on the democratic order in the United States; Immigrants pose a threat to the safety of Americans.]*

Populist Beliefs (adapted from Akkerman et al., 2014): “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements on a scale of 1-7 with 1 being *Strongly disagree* and 7 being *Strongly agree*.” *Politicians talk too much and do too little; The people, not the politicians, should make the most important political decisions; Politicians in the U.S. Congress must follow the will of the people; I would prefer to be represented by an ordinary citizen rather than by a career politician; What is called a ‘compromise’ in politics is really just a sellout of principles.*

Authoritarianism: Five items were used to assess authoritarian and anti-democratic attitudes based on the work of (Altemeyer, 1981). Three items were adapted from the KSA-3 Authoritarianism Short Scale (Beierlein et al., 2014), measuring authoritarian aggression, authoritarian submission, and conventionalism. Two additional items assessed preferences for dictatorship (GLES, 2015) and unelected expert decision-making (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002). Instructions were: “Below you will find a number of statements that some people agree with and others disagree with. What about you? Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements” using a 7-point scale with 1 being “Strongly disagree” and 7 being “Strongly agree.” *Under certain circumstances, a dictatorship is the better*

form of government; It would be better if decisions were made by unelected, independent experts rather than by politicians or citizens; Troublemakers should clearly feel that they are not welcome in society; People should leave important decisions in society to leaders; Established ways of behaving should not be questioned.

Left Behind: Left-behind perceptions were measured using four items adapted from measures of perceived lack of societal recognition employed in the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES, 2023; Steiner et al., 2023) and the Perceived Societal Marginalization Scale (Bollwerk et al., 2022). The items capture perceived lack of recognition concerning one's economic situation, work, values, and freedom to express one's opinions. Responses were recorded on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). "To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:" using a 7-point scale with 1 being "Strongly disagree" and 7 being "Strongly agree." *The economic situation of people like me receives too little attention in society; People like me receive too little recognition from society for the work we do; Society pays too little attention to the values of people like me; People like me are no longer allowed to freely express our opinions in public.*

Included in the survey but not analyzed here: Questions about news media consumption, media perceptions, and additional measures related to political identity and political views.

Study 1 measures that were not included in Study 2: Racial Identity Strength, Nonbinary acceptance, Attitudes Toward Homosexuality, Race Essentialism.

Ancillary Results

Study 1

In a simultaneous regression directly comparing effects of racial resentment and economic stress, with left-right political ideology, support for Joe Biden, education, income, age, and gender included as covariates, Trump support continued to be strongly predicted by racial resentment, $\beta = .30$, $t = 10.48$, $p < .001$, but not economic stress, $\beta = -.03$, $t = 1.34$, $p = .18$. In fact, besides the direct measure of ideology, $\beta = .45$, $t = 14.05$, $p < .001$, racial resentment was the strongest predictor (Biden support: $\beta = -.18$, $t = 6.74$, $p < .001$; gender: $\beta = .09$, $t = 4.23$, $p < .001$, such that Trump support was stronger among men; all other effects $p > .05$).

Study 2

In a simultaneous regression directly comparing effects of racial resentment and economic stress, with political ideology, education, income, age, and gender included as covariates, Trump support continued to be strongly predicted by racial resentment, $\beta = .25$, $t = 10.53$, $p < .001$, but negatively predicted by economic stress, $\beta = -.07$, $t = 3.57$, $p < .001$. As in Study 1, only

the direct measure of ideology was a stronger predictor of Trump support, $\beta = .58$, $t = 23.85$, $p < .001$ (education: $\beta = .05$, $t = 2.46$, $p = .014$; all other effects $p > .26$).

Regressions in which racial resentment and economic stress were included simultaneously as predictors of Trump support produced the same patterns across ideology groups—a strong effect of racial resentment and a relatively weaker, negative effect of economic stress: liberals ($N=399$; racial resentment, $\beta = .43$, $t = 9.53$, $p < .001$; economic stress, $\beta = -.15$, $t = 1.98$, $p = .049$), moderates ($N=398$; racial resentment, $\beta = .51$, $t = 11.64$, $p < .001$; economic stress, $\beta = -.10$, $t = 2.32$, $p = .021$), conservatives ($N = 409$; racial resentment, $\beta = .20$, $t = 4.15$, $p < .001$; economic stress, $\beta = -.39$, $t = 3.40$, $p < .001$).

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